A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"Tappan, Henry Philip
Religion
A Review of Edwards's "Inquiry into the Freedom of the Will"
Tappan, Henry Philip
Edwards, Jonathan, 1703-1758. Freedom of the will; Free will and determinism
What is true of guilt and retribution is true also of well-doing and
reward. If I do well, the volitions being determined by an antecedent
necessity, I could not possibly have done otherwise. It does not answer
the conditions of the case at all, to say I might have done otherwise,
if I had willed to do otherwise; because the will to do as I actually am
doing, is a will that could not have been otherwise. Give me, then, in
any action called good, great, noble, glorious, &c. the conviction that
the choice of this action was a necessary choice, predetermined in a
long and unbroken chain of necessary antecedents, and the sense of
praiseworthiness, and the judgement I ought to be rewarded, remain no
longer.
Merit and demerit are connected in our minds with our volitions, under
the impression that the good we perform, we perform in opposition to
temptation, and with the power and possibility of doing evil; and that
the evil we perform, we perform in opposition to motives of good, and
with the power and possibility of doing good. But when we are informed
that all the power and possibility of a conduct opposite to our actual
conduct is this,--that if we had put forth opposite volitions, there
would have been opposite external acts, but that nevertheless the
volitions themselves were necessary, and could not have been
otherwise,--we cannot but experience a revulsion of mind. We perhaps are
first led to doubt the philosophy,--or if, by acute reasonings, or by
the authority of great names, we are influenced to yield an implicit
belief,--the sense of merit and demerit must either die away, or be
maintained by a hasty retreat from the regions of speculation to those
of common sense.
XI. It follows from this system, also, that nature and spirit, as causes
or agents, cannot be distinguished in their operations.
There are three classes of natural causes or agents generally
acknowledged 1. Inanimate,--as water, wind, steam, magnetism, &c.; 2.
Animate, but insensible,--as the life and affinities of plants; 3.
Animate and sensitive, or brute animal power.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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