Some experts contended that with the fleet Port Arthur would prove invulnerable. The ships were to manœuvre outside where protected by the guns of the forts, and snatch advantages from the attacking fleet of the enemy. As it turned out the naval guns of the Japanese were better than the fortress guns of the Russians, and were used to better purpose. From the first the fleet, instead of being an aid to the defence of the fortress, was an immovable incubus, an inert dead weight, a crushing load which the forts had to protect always. If Russia had possessed a fighting navy in the Far East, the plan of campaign might have been different, or, if the same, the results might have been otherwise than they are. But a fighting navy Russia does not possess. I have already expressed the surprise I experienced when this was told to me; that surprise was equalled by the proof I subsequently received of its accuracy. I have overheard Russian naval officers state that they did not intend to fight, that they could not take this risk, or that, or some other. It has been on other occasions a subject of conversation amongst officers when I, a foreigner, was present; and I have even been told by certain officers that, at least, so far as they themselves were concerned, dying or being wounded in the defence of their country was just the last thing they intended to risk. These men had a different conception of their duties, their calling, and their status to that possessed by officers of our navy. In fact, some seemed to think it was wrong that their navy should ever have been called upon to fight, that fighting was a purpose for which it was never founded, and that, like a British gunboat, it was intended for diplomatic uses only. I do not assert that the officers who thought and spoke and acted in this way were a majority of the Russian navy, or even that they were fairly representative of the whole service; but I do believe they were as numerous as were the men who were keen for fighting, who were ready for battle, and wished to be engaged in struggling against the enemy’s fleet. The bulk of the sea-forces, so far as the officers are concerned, were more or less indifferent, inclining to prefer peace, and always to avoid personal risks. The men, like the soldiers of the Russian armies, are just simple fellows, doing their duty in war and peace because they are ordered to do certain things. The engineers and the gunners both were, I think, more inclined to shirk the risks, and to find excuses for absence on particular occasions, than anxious to distinguish themselves by gallant conduct in battle. Such men do not merit praise, but they must not be condemned too hastily, nor are they necessarily cowards.