A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human KnowledgeBerkeley, George
Philosophy
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Berkeley, George
Idealism; Knowledge, Theory of; Soul
72. THE ORDER OF OUR PERCEPTIONS SHOWS THE GOODNESS OF GOD, BUT
AFFORDS NO PROOF OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER.--If we follow the light
of reason, we shall, from the constant uniform method of our
sensations, collect the goodness and wisdom of the Spirit who
excites them in our minds; but this is all that I can see reasonably
concluded from thence. To me, I say, it is evident that the being of a
spirit infinitely wise, good, and powerful is abundantly sufficient to
explain all the appearances of nature. But, as for inert, senseless
Matter, nothing that I perceive has any the least connexion with it, or
leads to the thoughts of it. And I would fain see any one explain any the
meanest phenomenon in nature by it, or show any manner of reason, though
in the lowest rank of probability, that he can have for its existence, or
even make any tolerable sense or meaning of that supposition. For, as to
its being an occasion, we have, I think, evidently shown that with regard
to us it is no occasion. It remains therefore that it must be, if at all,
the occasion to God of exciting ideas in us; and what this amounts to we
have just now seen.
73. It is worth while to reflect a little on the motives which induced
men to suppose the existence of material substance; that so having
observed the gradual ceasing and expiration of those motives or reasons,
we may proportionably withdraw the assent that was grounded on them.
First, therefore, it was thought that colour, figure, motion, and the
rest of the sensible qualities or accidents, did really exist without the
mind; and for this reason it seemed needful to suppose some unthinking
substratum or substance wherein they did exist, since they could not be
conceived to exist by themselves. Afterwards, in process of time, men
being convinced that colours, sounds, and the rest of the sensible,
secondary qualities had no existence without the mind, they stripped this
substratum or material substance of those qualities, leaving only the
primary ones, figure, motion, and suchlike, which they still conceived to
exist without the mind, and consequently to stand in need of a material
support. But, it having been shown that none even of these can possibly
exist otherwise than in a Spirit or Mind which perceives them it follows
that we have no longer any reason to suppose the being of Matter; nay,
that it is utterly impossible there should be any such thing, so long as
that word is taken to denote an unthinking substratum of qualities or
accidents wherein they exist without the mind.
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