A View of Sir Isaac Newton's PhilosophyPemberton, Henry
Science
A View of Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy
Pemberton, Henry
Newton, Isaac, 1642-1727. Principia
to all, that fall under our notice. Whether some of the qualities and
powers of particular bodies, be derived from different kinds of matter
entring their composition, cannot, in the present imperfect state
of our knowledge, absolutely be decided; though we have not yet any
reason to conclude, but that all the bodies, with which we converse,
are framed out of the very same kind of matter, and that their
distinct qualities are occasioned only by their structure; through
the variety whereof the general powers of matter are caused to produce
different effects. On the other hand, we should not hastily conclude,
that whatever is found to appertain to all matter, which falls under
our examination, must for that reason only be an essential property
thereof, and not be derived from some unseen disposition in the frame
of nature. Sir ~ISAAC NEWTON~ has found reason to conclude,
that gravity is a property universally belonging to all the perceptible
bodies in the universe, and to every particle of matter, whereof they
are composed. But yet he no where asserts this property to be essential
to matter. And he was so far from having any design of establishing
it as such, that, on the contrary, he has given some hints worthy of
himself at a cause for it[40]; and expresly says, that he proposed
those hints to shew, that he had no such intention[41].
19. IT appears from hence, that it is not easy to determine, what
properties of bodies are essentially inherent in the matter, out of
which they are made, and what depend upon their frame and composition.
But certainly whatever properties are found to belong either to any
particular systems of matter, or universally to all, must be considered
in philosophy; because philosophy will be otherwise imperfect. Whether
those properties can be deduced from some other appertaining to
matter, either among those, which are already known, or among such as
can be discovered by us, is afterwards to be sought for the farther
improvement of our knowledge. But this inquiry cannot properly have
place in the deliberation about admitting any property of matter or
bodies into philosophy; for that purpose it is only to be considered,
whether the existence of such a property has been justly proved or not.
Therefore to decide what causes of things are rightly received into
natural philosophy, requires only a distinct and clear conception of
what kind of reasoning is to be allowed of as convincing, when we argue
upon the works of nature.
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