These duties can for the rest be only carried out under war conditions and against an enemy who is working to the same end, if undertaken in a regular and systematic way and with great boldness. The patrol leader, therefore, should generally make his plan in the evening for the following day. It will be desirable for him to study the map very closely, and to impress on his memory the main roads and especially points which appear to be suitable for observation. He can thus obtain an impression of the succession of stages necessary for his advance, and judge how he can best spare his horses without prejudicing the success of the reconnaissance. For a patrol to move _en masse_ without scouts, as unfortunately is often done in peace, is altogether out of the question. In war such conduct must often be paid for by the lives of the patrol and the complete failure of the enterprise. A point must always be sent so far ahead that the patrol will not come under fire at the same time with it. It should never happen that the point collides unexpectedly with the enemy. A rear-guard will also in most cases be found desirable. Circumstances must determine how the flanks can best be protected. Should the patrol be obliged to ride through country where it might be surprised, it will be advisable first to make a halt and to send on scouts. Manoeuvres have repeatedly proved that the point is insufficient in such a case. It is in most cases quite inadmissible, especially in hostile country, to divide the patrol and to arrange a meeting-place farther to the front. As there will usually be at most but one map available, the detached party will find themselves in the enemy's country without means of locating themselves, probably unable to make themselves understood by the inhabitants, and in any case will run the danger of being betrayed by them. It will not even be of much avail if they are given some kind of sketch if they meet with and are chased by the enemy. I should therefore like to utter a warning against the custom of such division of patrols in peace which could not be carried out in the enemy's country. In friendly country they are possible, but always dangerous. The various detachments having insufficient fighting strength, the possibility of sending back information will be reduced and a junction will always be doubtful, while any collision with the enemy may make it impossible. There is another error into which patrols frequently fall in peace manoeuvres, and that is, of leaving the road assigned to them for observation without sufficient reason, and of using other roads upon which other patrols are working. Even when a patrol has sure indication that it will not meet with the enemy upon the road assigned to it, it should still remain upon this road, and send back definite negative information, even if no instructions to this effect have been received.