If we grant the principle here assumed, the conclusion follows of necessity. But let us inquire in what sense motive and volition sustain to each other the relation of cause and effect. _The presence and action of one power causes the action of another, so far, and so far only, as it necessitates such action; and causes its action in a particular direction, so far only as it necessitates its action in that direction, in opposition to every other_. Now the action of one power may cause the action of another, in one or both these ways. 1. It may necessitate its action, and necessitate it in one direction in opposition to any and every other. In this sense, fire causes the sensation of pain. It necessitates the action of the Sensibility, and in that one direction. Or, 2. One power may necessitate the _action_ of another power, but not necessitate its action in one direction in opposition to any or all others. We have seen, in a former chapter, that the Motive causes the action of the Will in this sense only, that it necessitates the Will to act in some direction, but not in one direction in distinction from another. Now the error of President Edwards lies in confounding these two senses of the word _cause_. He assumes that when one power causes the action of another in any sense, it must in every sense. It is readily admitted, that in one sense the Motive causes the action of the Will. But when we ask for the reason or cause of any one particular choice in distinction from another, we find it, not in the motive, but in the power of willing itself. OBJECTION--PARTICULAR VOLITION, HOW ACCOUNTED FOR. III. We are also prepared to notice the great objection of Necessitarians to the doctrine of Liberty as here maintained. How, it is asked, shall we account, on this theory, for _particular_ volitions? The power to will only accounts for acts of Will in _some_ direction, but not for one act in distinction from another. This distinction must be accounted for, or we have an event without a cause. To this argument I reply, 1. It assumes the position in debate, to wit: that there cannot be consequents which are not necessarily connected with particular antecedents, which antecedents necessitate these particular consequents in distinction from all others. 2. To account for any effect, all that can properly be required is, to assign the existence and operation of a cause adequate to the production of such effects. Free-agency itself is such a cause in the case now under consideration. We have here given the existence and operation of a cause which must produce one of two effects, and is equally capable, under the circumstances, of producing either. Such a cause accounts for the existence of such an effect, just as much as the assignment of an antecedent necessarily producing certain consequents, accounts for those consequents.