largely dependent for their position upon the actual development of the various sciences in Hegel’s own time. Hence the method seems unsuitable for the original attainment of philosophical truth. At best it might serve, as Lotze has remarked, as a convenient method for the arrangement of truth already obtained by other means, and even for this purpose it seems clear that the succession of categories actually adopted by Hegel would require constant modification to adapt the general scheme to later developments of the various special sciences. _Consult further_:—F. H. Bradley, _Appearance and Reality_, chaps. 13, 14; B. Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, Lect. 2; Shadworth Hodgson, _Metaphysic of Experience_, bk. i. chap. 1; J. S. Mackenzie, _Outlines of Metaphysics_, bk. i. chaps. 2 and 4. And for criticism of the Hegelian dialectic: J. E. M‘Taggart, _Studies in Hegelian Dialectic_, chaps. 1-3; J. B. Baillie, _The Origin and Significance of Hegel’s Logic_, chaps. 8-12, especially chap. 12; and also Adamson, _Development of Modern Philosophy_, bk. i. pp. 271 ff. ----- Footnote 10: See Bosanquet, _Essentials of Logic_, Lect. 8. As an illustration we may take an extreme case: “The Jabberwock was not killed yesterday.” What is the ground of this denial? At first sight it appears to be merely negative, “there are no such things as Jabberwocks to kill.” But before I can say “there are no such things as Jabberwocks” with confidence, I must have enough positive information about the structure and habits of animals to be aware that the qualities ascribed to the Jabberwock conflict with the laws of animal life. Or, if I deny the existence of Jabberwocks simply on the ground that I have never come across a specimen, this involves a positive judgment as to the relation between the animal world and the part of it I have examined, such as, “if there were Jabberwocks, I should have come across one”; or, “my acquaintance with the varieties of animals is sufficiently exhaustive to afford ground for a valid generalisation.” The fact that symbolic Logic finds it _convenient_ to treat the universal affirmative as a double negative must not mislead us as to its actual priority in thought. Footnote 11: To meet the kind of criticism which finds it humorous to jest at the expense of those who “take consolation from spelling Reality with a big R,” may I once for all say that when I spell Reality thus it is simply as a convenient way of distinguishing the ultimately from the merely relatively real? Footnote 12: We shall meet this same difficulty again later on as the principle of the famous Kantian objection to the “ontological proof” of God’s existence. _Infra_, Bk. IV. chap. 5. § 8. Footnote 13: