Europe -- Politics and government -- 1815-1848; France -- Foreign relations -- Great Britain
But, as the moment approached for setting in motion General Hinüber's
Federal _corps d'armée_, the French government evinced symptoms
of alarm. Sébastiani begged Talleyrand to try by all means in his
power to discover some less objectionable method of terminating
the difficulty. The King and his ministers, he assured him, placed
their entire trust in his wisdom and vast experience.[129] Casimir
Périer impressed upon Lord Granville that he would be powerless to
restrain the army, were the Prussians and the Dutch to attack the
Belgians "ranged under the tricolour." "Sufficient allowance," he
pleaded, "was not made for the weakness of a government sprung from a
revolution."[130] Talleyrand, however, reported that, in spite of his
efforts and of those of Prince Leopold to make the Belgians listen
to reason, they refused obstinately to accept the conditions imposed
upon them. At the Hague there was, he believed, a keen desire to bring
on a general war, whilst the Tsar Nicholas was not sorry that the
attention of the western Powers should be diverted from Poland to the
Low Countries. In England men's minds were concentrated exclusively
upon the Reform Bill, and the knowledge that France and Great Britain
were confronted by grave domestic problems undoubtedly encouraged
the Belgians to defy the conference. Under these circumstances, his
favourite scheme, the partition of the country, appeared to him the
only practicable solution of the question. But on this occasion the
idea of acquiring some part of Belgium offered no attractions to the
French government. "We are disposed to think," answered Sébastiani,
"that any partition would recall that of Poland, and would not be
popular."[131]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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