comes from holding a fortress in a foreign country!
But while this is true, yet what are such petty vexations as smuggling
and extradition; what is the million of dollars a year which it costs to
keep Gibraltar; in a matter which concerns the majesty and the colossal
pride of England--the sense of power to hold her own against the world?
A hundred years ago Burke spoke of Gibraltar with exultation as "a post
of power, a post of superiority, of connection, of commerce--one which
makes us invaluable to our friends and dreadful to our enemies;" and the
feeling has survived to this day. Not an Englishman passes through the
Straits whose heart does not swell within him to see the flag of his
country floating from the top of the Rock, from which, as he believes,
the whole world cannot tear it down. Every true Briton would look upon
the lowering of that flag as the abdication of Imperial power.
But is not this an over-estimate of the value of Gibraltar to England?
Is it worth all it costs? Would it weigh much in the balance in a great
contest of nations for the mastery of the world? The object of this
Rock-fortress is to command the passage into the Mediterranean. The arms
of Gibraltar are a Castle and a Key, to signify that it holds the key of
the Straits, and that no ship flying any other flag than that of England
can enter or depart except by her permission. But that power is already
gone. England may hold the key of the Straits, but the door is too wide
to be bolted. The hundred-ton guns of Gibraltar, even if aimed directly
seaward, could not destroy or stop a passing fleet. I know this is not
the limit of construction in modern ordnance. Guns have been wrought
weighing a hundred and twenty tons, which throw a ball weighing a ton
over ten miles! Such a gun mounted at Tarifa might indeed hurl its
tremendous bolt across the Mediterranean into Africa. But Tarifa is in
Spain, while opposite Gibraltar it is fourteen miles to Ceuta, a point
not to be reached by any ordnance in existence, even if the last product
of modern warfare were mounted on the height of O'Hara's Tower; so that
a fleet of ironclads, hugging the African coast, would be quite safe
from the English fire, which could not prevent the entrance of a French
or German or Russian fleet into the Mediterranean, if it were strong
enough to encounter the English fleet.
The reliance must be therefore on the fleet, not on the fortress. Of
course the latter would be a refuge in case of disaster, where the
English ships could find protection under the guns of the fort. But the
fortress _alone_ could not bar the passage into the Mediterranean.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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