I went from him to Dr. Zimmermann (the under Secretary) who was acting for Herr von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary), and learned from him that Russia was about to call up nine hundred thousand new troops. His words unmistakably denoted ill-humor against Russia, who, he said, stood everywhere in our way. In addition, there were questions of commercial policy that had to be settled. That General von Moltke was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky (the German Ambassador in Vienna) had been reproved because he said that he had advised Vienna to show moderation toward Serbia. Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home in Silesia, quite unaware of the impending crisis. He continues: When I returned from Silesia on my way to London, I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end an unbearable state of affairs. Unfortunately, I failed at the moment to gauge the significance of the news. I thought that once more it would come to nothing; that even if Russia acted threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and declare there and then that I would have no hand in such a policy. There was a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5th, between the German and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was decided on. Prince Lichnowsky says: I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England). At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow to "Greater-Serbian" hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand against Austria. I remembered England's attitude during the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project, which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recommended that counsels of moderation he given Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized (that is to say, it could not be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia).