Humanism and America : $b Essays on the outlook of modern civilisation — John Shaqi
Humanism and America : $b Essays on the outlook of modern civilisation
Philosophy
Humanism and America : $b Essays on the outlook of modern civilisation
Humanism; Literature -- Philosophy; Philosophy, Modern; United States -- Civilization -- 20th century
The philosophers have often debated the question of the priority of
will or intellect in man. The quality of will that I am discussing and
that rightly deserves to be accounted superrational, has, however,
been associated in traditional Christianity not primarily with man’s
will, but with God’s will in the form of grace. The theologians have
indulged in many unprofitable subtleties apropos of grace. One cannot
afford, however, as has been the modern tendency, to discard the
psychological truth of the doctrine along with these subtleties. The
higher will must simply be accepted as a mystery that may be studied in
its practical effects, but that, in its ultimate nature, is incapable
of formulation. Herein the higher will is not peculiar. “All things,”
according to the scholastic maxim, “end in a mystery” (_Omnia exeunt in
mysterium_). The man of science is increasingly willing to grant that
the reality behind the phenomena he is studying not only eludes him,
but must in the nature of the case ever elude him. He no longer holds,
for example, as his more dogmatic forebears of the nineteenth century
inclined to do, that the mechanistic hypothesis, valuable as it has
proved itself to be as a laboratory technique, is absolutely true; its
truth is, he admits, relative and provisional.
The person who declines to turn the higher will to account until he
is sure he has grasped its ultimate nature is very much on a level
with the man who should refuse to make practical use of electrical
energy until he is certain he has an impeccable theory of electricity.
Negatively one may say of the higher will, without overstepping
the critical attitude, that it is not the absolute, nor again the
categorical imperative; not the organic and still less the mechanical;
finally, not the “ideal” in the current sense of that term. Positively
one may define it as the higher immediacy that is known in its
relation to the lower immediacy--the merely temperamental man with
his impressions and emotions and expansive desires--as a power of
vital control (_frein vital_). Failure to exercise this control is the
spiritual indolence that is for both Christian and Buddhist a chief
source, if not the chief source, of evil. Though Aristotle, after the
Greek fashion, gives the primacy not to will but to mind, the power of
which I have been speaking is surely related to his “energy of soul,”
the form of activity distinct from a mere outer working, deemed by
him appropriate for the life of leisure that he proposes as the goal
of a liberal education. Happiness, which is for him the end of ends,
is itself, he tells us, “a kind of working.” Here is a difference,
one may note in passing, between a true humanist like Aristotle and
the epicurean who also has his doctrine of moderation and so often
sets up as a humanist. It is no doubt well, as the epicurean urges,
so to indulge in present pleasures that they may not be injurious to
future ones.
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