France. Armée; Joffre, Joseph Jacques Césaire, 1852-1931; World War, 1914-1918
Joffre belongs to the African school of soldier, against whom is
reproached an impetuous bravery without science or system, and only
possible against an enemy untrained, ill-equipped, and ignorant of
tactics. It was thought that men were unfitted to fight against a
civilised enemy after their contact with the rude warriors of the desert
and jungle; but by a curious coincidence, Joffre, Galliéni, Marchand,
Gouraud, and Bailloud (Sarrail’s lieutenant in his retreat through
Macedonia), all learned their business of soldiering in the waste places
of the earth, in overcoming the obstacles of rebellious Nature or the
treachery of tribes. But Joffre has shown, as others have shown, that
this contact with difficulties brings out the man and educates,
strengthens, and vitalises him. Often the faults of others have been
placed on the broad back of the Generalissimo. He has been accused of
ignoring the German intentions to invade France through Belgium. What
was his Intelligence Department doing that they did not know? But
Joffre and his staff were well aware of the plan, and they knew also the
different stages of the march. But what they had not reckoned upon was
the rapid fall of the forts of Liège and Namur before the heavy guns of
the invaders. That the Germans possessed siege artillery was a matter
of common knowledge in France; but alas! to meet it was involved a large
expenditure which Parliament would not sanction. That is the reason of
it. "Cherchez la politique" is the answer to the shortage in heavy
ordnance and in armoured aeroplanes.
It would take too long to tabulate the various attempts to extort money
from Deputies for the national defence. But though the attenuated
credits cannot be laid to the charge of the General Staff, it is true
that experts were divided on the use that could be made of the heavy
siege-pieces which the Germans thrust into battle. Such cumbersome
weapons would prove white elephants said some in authority, and
protested that they could not "hold" the infantry. However that may be,
Joffre was faced with the difficulty that the Germans, instead of
entering France by the eastern gate, where forts and "cover" combined to
make the task supremely difficult, chose the easier road by Belgium and
through the Luxembourg. Yet it was obviously impossible to tell by
which route the enemy would enter. Joffre was forced to watch them all,
to secure contact at each point, to feel the enemy, and then retreat
towards his reserves. This, indeed, was the plan more or less
successfully carried out. But the fact that Belgium was the main path
of the invasion caused a rapid transposition of forces at the last
moment, for the bulk of the army had to swing from the east to the
north, and the process took time. Here, again, the Germans were at an
advantage, for they had systematically built railways to the edge of the
Luxembourg and in Alsace-Lorraine, so that their mobilisation was
startlingly rapid.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account