With the belief in the absolute freedom of the will and the personal immortality of the soul is associated, in the minds of many highly educated people, a third article of faith, the belief in a personal God. It is well known that this belief, often wrongly represented as an indispensable foundation of religion, assumes the most widely varied shapes. As a rule, however, it is an open or covert anthropomorphism. God is conceived as the "Supreme Being," but turns out, on closer examination, to be an idealised man. According to the Mosaic narrative, "God made man to his own image and likeness," but it is usually the reverse; "Man made God according to his own image and likeness." This idealised man becomes creator and architect and produces the world, forming the various species of plants and animals like a modeller, governing the world like a wise and all-powerful monarch, and, at the "Last Judgment," rewarding the good and punishing the wicked like a rigorous judge. The childish conceptions of this extramundane God, who is set over against the world as an independent being, the personal creator, maintainer, and ruler of all things, are quite incompatible with the advanced science of the nineteenth century, especially with its two greatest triumphs, the law of substance and the law of Monistic evolution. Critical philosophy, moreover, long ago pronounced its doom. In the first place, the most famous critical thinker, Immanuel Kant, proved in his _Critique of Pure Reason_ that absolute science affords no support to the three central dogmas of metaphysics, the personal God, the immortality of the soul, and the freedom of the will. It is true that he afterwards (in the course of his dualistic and dogmatic metamorphosis) taught that we must _believe_ these three great mystic forces, and that they are indispensable postulates of practical reason; and that the latter must take precedence over pure reason. Modern German philosophy, which clamours for a "return to Kant," sees his chief distinction in this impossible reconciliation of polar contradictions. The Churches, and the ruling powers in alliance with them, accord a welcome to this diametrical contradiction, recognised by all candid readers of the Königsberg philosopher, between the two reasons. They use the confusion that results for the purpose of putting the light of the creeds in the darkness of doubting reason, and imagine that they save religion in this way.