Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition — John Shaqi
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical ExpositionDewey, John
Philosophy
Leibniz's New Essays Concerning the Human Understanding: A Critical Exposition
Dewey, John
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646-1716
The metaphor which Locke constantly uses is the clew to his conception
of innate ideas. They are characters stamped or imprinted upon the
mind, they exist _in_ the mind. The mind would be just what it is,
even if they had no existence. It would not have quite so much "in"
it, but its own nature would not be changed. Innate ideas he conceives
as bearing a purely external relation to mind. They are not organic
to it, nor necessary instruments through which it expresses itself;
they are mechanically impressed upon it. But what the "intellectual"
school had meant by innate ideas was precisely that the relation of
ideas to intelligence is _not_ that of passive holding or containing
on the side of mind, and of impressions or stamps on the side of the
ideas. Locke reads the fundamental category of empiricism--mechanical
relation, or external action--into the nature of innate ideas, and
hence easily infers their absurdity. But the object of the upholders
of innate ideas had been precisely to deny that this category was
applicable to the whole of intelligence. By an innate idea they meant
an assertion of the dynamic relation of intelligence and some of its
ideas. They meant to assert that intelligence has a structure, which
necessarily functions in certain ways. While Locke's highest conception
of an innate idea was that it must be something ready made, dwelling
in the mind prior to experience, Leibniz everywhere asserts that it
is a connection and relation which forms the logical prius and the
psychological basis of experience. He finds no difficulty in admitting
all there is of positive truth in Locke's doctrine; namely, that we are
not conscious of these innate ideas until a period later than that in
which we are conscious of sensible facts, or, in many cases, are not
conscious of them at all. This priority in time of sensible experience
to rational knowledge, however, can become a reason for denying the
"innate" character of the latter only when we suppose that they are two
entirely different orders of fact, one knowledge due to experience,
the other knowledge already formed and existing in the mind prior to
"experience."
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account