Of the staff-officers the most notable were Major-General Alexei Petrovich Yermólov and Colonel Baron Charles Toll. The former was an extraordinary personality, who seems to have retained more barbarian characteristics than any European military leader of modern times. He was a man of great courage, considerable ability, and remarkable will-power; but of a savage and unstable disposition. He could be guilty of gross cruelty to prisoners of war, and later, as Viceroy of the Caucasus, relied, as he admitted with cynical frankness, upon a policy of indiscriminate massacre. Yet he was a kind and considerate commander, beloved by his troops, and not ungenerous in his treatment of subordinates. This treacherous side of his character would induce him to intrigue against a rival, with whom he would then suddenly become reconciled on some impulse of generosity. He intrigued against Barclay, but wept bitterly when that ill-used chief left the army. It may have been hypocrisy, as Löwenstern says; but it really has more resemblance to one of those impulses which civilised men can hardly understand, but which are characteristic of barbaric natures, such as Yermólov’s. Yermólov’s policy of massacre failed to pacify Caucasia, and his successor Paskievich declared it to have been a gross blunder. Nevertheless, Yermólov has continued to this day to be the subject of somewhat indiscriminate eulogy. It is perhaps better to take the opinion of men who knew him. Barclay’s was terse and to the point: “An able man, but false and intriguing.” Alexander’s was pithy: “His heart is as black as his boot.” Clausewitz, who was little associated with him, admitted his ability. Toll was a scientific soldier of considerable attainments, and played a distinguished part during the years 1812-1815. Of the officers who, during the campaign, commanded detachments or army corps several were men of real distinction. General Mikhail Andreïevich Miloradovich--“the Russian Murat”--was in charge of the advance-guard which pressed the French retreat. The Russian documents show that he was hardly so much the mere swordsman as Tolstoï would make him. Both in 1812 and 1813 Miloradovich distinguished himself greatly, showing himself to be as admirable in rear-guard command as he was in the leading of the pursuit. Lieutenant-General Count Peter Wittgenstein, the German commander of the 1st Army Corps, gained considerable renown by his independent operations against Napoleon’s left wing. In high command he always failed; but as a corps commander he was equal to most of the French marshals, and, though frequently rash and inconsiderate, was never lacking in stubbornness and energy.