Here Grey speaks only of four of the big powers at most that may go to war, without even hinting at the fifth, namely, England. On July 24 he had another conversation with the Austrian Ambassador, the theme of which was the note--meanwhile presented to Servia. It caused apprehensions on his part, but he declared again: The merits of the dispute between Austria and Servia were not the concern of his Majesty's Government.... I [Grey] ended by saying that doubtless we should enter into an exchange of views with other powers, and that I must await their views as to what could be done to mitigate the difficulties of the situation.--(British "White Paper" No. 5.) We are already striking the fateful peculiarity of Grey's policy to hesitate where prompt action, or at least a clear and open conduct, would have been his duty. This weakness of his nature has been used with great art by French and Russian diplomacy. This is illustrated by the conversation of July 24 between him and the French Ambassador, Cambon, in London: M. Cambon said that, if there was a chance of mediation by the four powers he had no doubt that his Government would be glad to join in it; but he pointed out that we could not say anything in St. Petersburg till Russia had expressed some opinion or taken some action. But, when two days were over, Austria would march into Servia, for the Servians could not possibly accept the Austrian demand. Russia would be compelled by her public opinion to take action as soon as Austria attacked Servia, and, therefore, once the Austrians had attacked Servia it would be too late for any mediation.--(British "White Paper" No. 10.) Thus, England must not give any advice to Russia before it knows Russia's intent and even its measures. But inasmuch as Austria will have proceeded against Servia by that time Russia must make war, and the conclusion is that even on July 24 the catastrophe is considered unavoidable. Grey shows himself more and more hypnotized by the fatalistic view that it is too late. Hence he reports also on July 24 a conversation of the German Ambassador, Prince Lichnowsky: I reminded the German Ambassador that some days ago he had expressed a personal hope that if need arose I would endeavor to exercise moderating influence at St. Petersburg, but now I said that, in view of the extraordinarily stiff character of the Austrian note, the shortness of time allowed, and the wide scope of the demands upon Servia, I felt quite helpless as far as Russia was concerned, and I did not believe any power could exercise influence alone.--(British "White Paper" No. 11.) From a conversation of Grey with the Prince Lichnowsky, the German Ambassador, on July 25: