This is work for which a detachment of cavalry is frequently told off to do the advanced, flank, and rear guards. In order to save the horses, it will be found best to divide the respective forces and work _en bondes_, moving quickly over open ground, and getting into successive positions where cover is available. In each of these a rest, and possibly a mouthful of grass, will serve to keep the horses fresh. Nothing is more annoying to a column commander, who has regard for his horses, than to see one of his mounted men using his horse as an easy-chair whilst delay takes place at some difficult crossing. Strict orders are necessary in this matter. Many a time have we seen an irascible commanding officer ride up behind one of these spectators and jerk him violently off his horse. It may not be out of place here to say that an escort to a convoy should invariably be at least twice the strength of any force which is likely to attack it. The handicap of being tied to a convoy following a certain route and supplying detachments for advanced and flank guards and of fighting on ground of the enemy’s choosing, etc., necessitates this, if safety is desired. Small parties of horsemen should be sent on, wide of and parallel to the road, to get touch of the enemy; the principle of separating the rôle of information and security is thus adhered to. CHAPTER XV RAIDS The very idea of a cavalry raid is attractive and carries with it a certain romance. It is impossible to do otherwise than admire the boldness of the conception of Stuart’s raid in 1862, when, with 1200 men and two guns, he rode right round the Federal lines, alarmed McClellan, and caused him to withdraw troops to cover his line of cavalry and thus weaken his first line. Yet even this raid, brilliant as it was and tactically successful, is said to be strategically a mistake. For, to quote General Alexander’s _American Civil War_, it “seriously alarmed McClellan for his rear. But for it the probabilities are he would never have given the subject any thought, and he certainly would not have been prepared with a fleet of loaded transports on hand when he was, soon after, forced to change his base to Harrison’s landing on the James River.... On the whole, therefore, the _éclat_ of our brilliant raid lost us much more than its results were worth. Where important strategy is on foot, too great care can scarcely be used to avoid making any such powerful suggestion to the enemy as resulted in this case.”