We have attempted, above, to deal with evolutionary ethics only in the one point of its supposed connection with pleasure as a standard. Accounts and criticisms of a broader scope will be found in Darwin, Descent of Man; Martineau, Op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 335-393; Schurman, Ethical Import of Darwinism; Sorley, Ethics of Naturalism, chapters V, and VI; Stephen, Science of Ethics, particularly pp. 31-34; 78-89; 359-379; Royce, Religious Aspect of Philosophy, pp. 74-85; Everett, Poetry, Comedy and Duty, Essay on the New Ethics; Seth in Mind, Jan. 1889, on Evolution of Morality; Dewey, Andover Review, Vol. VII, p. 570; Hyslop, Ibid., Vol. IX, p. 348. XXVII. Formal Ethics. We come now to the ethical theories which attempt to find the good not only in the will itself, but in the will irrespective of any end to be reached by the will. The typical instance of such theories is the Kantian, and we shall, therefore, make that the basis of our examination. Kant's theory, however, is primarily a theory not of the good, but of the nature of duty, and that makes a statement of his doctrine somewhat more difficult. "The concept of good and evil must not be determined before the moral law (of which it seems as if it must be the foundation), but only after it and by means of it" (Abbott's Trans., p. 154). Separating, as far as we can, his theory of the good from that of duty, we get the following results: 1. Goodness belongs to the will, and to that alone. "Nothing can possibly be conceived, in the world or out of it, which can be called good without qualification except a good will." The will is not good because of what it brings about, or what it is fitted to bring about; that is, it is not good on account of its adaptation to any end outside of itself. It is good in itself. "It is like a jewel which shines by its own light, having its whole value in itself." 2. The good, then, is not to be found in any _object_ of will or of desire, nor in the will _so far as it is directed towards an end outside itself_. For the will to be moved by inclination or by desire is for it to be moved for the sake of some external end, which, moreover, is always pleasure (Kant, _i. e._, agrees with the hedonists regarding the object of desire, but on that very ground denies that pleasure is the good or the desirable). If, then, no object of desire can be the motive of a good will, what is its motive? Evidently only some principle derived from the will itself. The good will is the will which acts from regard to its own law. 3. What is the nature of this law? All objects of desire (_i. e._, all material) have been excluded from it. It must, therefore, be purely formal. The only content of the law of the good will is the _idea of law itself_. The good will acts from reverences for law as _law_. It not only acts _in conformity with law_, but has the conception of law as its directing spring.