[25] viz. As it appears to me, a pleasurable, a profitable, and a virtuous end, which last is a truly beautiful and good end. [26] For φιλτρων here, I read φιληδονιων. [27] The multitude are ignorant that they are ignorant with respect to objects of all others the most splendid and real; but the Coryphæan philosopher is ignorant that he is ignorant with respect to objects most unsubstantial and obscure. The former ignorance is the consequence of a defect, but the latter of a transcendency of gnostic energy. What Porphyry here says of the Coryphæan philosopher, is derived from the Theætetus of Plato. [28] See p. 52 of my translation of the Theætetus of Plato, from which Dialogue, what Porphyry here says, as well as what he a little before said, is derived. [29] See the Phædo of Plato, where this is asserted. [30] Sense, and that which is beautiful in the energies of sense, are thus denominated by Plato. [31] The rational part of the soul is assimilated by Plato, in the Phædrus, to a charioteer, and the two irrational parts, _desire_ and _anger_, to two horses. See my translation of that Dialogue. [32] A kind of bread made of milk and flour. [33] In the original, αλλα παρασκευασαμενον το θαρρειν τῃ ψυχῃ γνησιως ουτως αντεχεσθαι των καθ’ ημεραν. But the editor of the quarto edition of this work, who appears to have been nothing more than a mere verbal critic, says, in a note on this passage, that the word αντεχεσθαι, signifies _pertinacissime illis inhærere, nihil ultra studere_; whereas it must be obvious to any man who understands what is here said, that in this place it signifies _to endure_. [34] In the original, ο μη κυριευσει της τελειας εκθαρρησεως; but for εκθαρρησεως I read with Felicianus εκκαθαρσεως. [35] In the original, ελαχιστον γαρ και το οχληρον εκ του ελαχιστου. But it is obviously necessary for οχληρον to read ανοχληρον, and yet this was not perceived by the German editor of this work, Jacob Rhoer. [36] _i.e._ Of our reasonings about intelligible objects. [37] Conformable to this, it is beautifully observed by Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, that corporeal pleasures are the remedies of pain, and that they fill up the indigence of nature, but do not perfect any energy of the [rational] soul. [38] This is said by Porphyry, in his Life of Plotinus, to have been the case with the senator Rogatianus. [39] And leisure, to those who knew how rightly to employ it, is, as Socrates said, καλλιστον κτηματων, “_the most beautiful of possessions_.” ON ABSTINENCE FROM ANIMAL FOOD. BOOK THE SECOND.