There are two recent cases on this point. In June, 1915, a young man named Ugo da Prato, who was born in Boston in 1895 and had gone to Italy in 1912 to study architecture, was held by the Italian government as liable to military duty because his father, Antonio da Prato, had been a native of Italy. He had emigrated to America and had been naturalized in Boston in 1892. Under our American law, the son Ugo, born on American soil, was an American. The Italian law, however, holds that Italian subjects who have acquired citizenship in other countries are not exempted from the obligations of military service, nor from the penalties imposed on those who bear arms against their country. Italy subsequently released Ugo da Prato. A similar situation arose in the case of one de Long, of Louisiana, who was born in America of a French father who had never been naturalized. Upon his inquiry to the State Department as to what his status would be in France if he were to return there during the war, the State Department advised him that while he was by the law of America an American citizen, by the law of France he was a French citizen, and they declined to encourage him to test the matter by returning to France while the war was in progress. The real question at issue, of course, is whether or not a nation has the right to regard its control over its subject as a thing of which it can refuse to divest itself. The Ottoman law is that no transfer of allegiance to which the consent of the Ottoman government has not been previously obtained is binding. The French law is similar; the French government rarely consents to permit a Frenchman of military age to throw off his allegiance. Under certain conditions, however, permission may be obtained. The Greek government generally refuses to recognize a change of nationality made without consent. Neither does the Persian government, nor the Russian government. Under Russian law, a Russian subject who becomes a citizen of another country without the consent of the Russian government is deemed to have committed an offense for which he is liable to arrest and punishment if he returns without having previously obtained permission of the Russian government. This second form of dual allegiance, which would more properly be stated as the attempt to hold that the change of allegiance either did not take place at all or else was not thoroughgoing, bears in itself the possibility of very serious complications. Our naturalized citizens and the native-born children of foreign-born parents have a right to determine that the allegiance they have chosen to swear to the United States be protected.