The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)Hazlitt, William
Philosophy
The collected works of William Hazlitt, Vol. 11 (of 12)
Hazlitt, William
English essays -- 19th century
Secondly, besides stating the opinions of others, one principal object
which I shall have in view will be to act as judge or umpire between
them, to distinguish, as far as I am able, the boundaries of true and
false philosophy, and to try if I cannot lay the foundation of a system
more conformable to reason and experience, and, in its practical results
at least, approaching nearer to the common sense of mankind, than the
one which has been generally received by the most knowing persons who
have attended to such subjects within the last century; I mean the
material or _modern_ philosophy, as it has been called. According to
this philosophy, as I understand it, all thought is to be resolved into
sensation, all morality into the love of pleasure, and all action into
mechanical impulse. These three propositions, taken together, embrace
almost every question relating to the human mind, and in their different
ramifications and intersections form a net, not unlike that used by the
enchanters of old, which, whosoever has once thrown over him, will find
all his efforts to escape vain, and his attempts to reason freely on any
subject in which his own nature is concerned, baffled and confounded in
every direction.
This system, which first rose at the suggestion of Lord Bacon, on the
ruins of the school-philosophy, has been gradually growing up to its
present height ever since, from a wrong interpretation of the word
_experience_, confining it to a knowledge of things without us; whereas
it in fact includes all knowledge relating to objects either within or
out of the mind, of which we have any direct and positive evidence. We
only know that we ourselves exist, the most certain of all truths, from
the experience of what passes within ourselves. Strictly speaking, all
other facts of which we are not immediately conscious, are so in a
secondary and subordinate sense only. Physical experience is indeed the
foundation and the test of that part of philosophy which relates to
physical objects: further, physical analogy is the only rule by which we
can extend and apply our immediate knowledge, or infer the effects to be
produced by the different objects around us. But to say that physical
experiment is either the test or source or guide of that other part of
philosophy which relates to our internal perceptions, that we are to
look to external nature for the form, the substance, the colour, the
very life and being of whatever exists in our minds, or that we can only
infer the laws which regulate the phenomena of the mind from those which
regulate the phenomena of matter, is to confound two things entirely
distinct. Our knowledge of mental phenomena from consciousness,
reflection, or observation of their correspondent signs in others is the
true basis of metaphysical inquiry, as the knowledge of _facts_,
commonly so called, is the only solid basis of natural philosophy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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