The conscience of a ConservativeGoldwater, Barry M. (Barry Morris)
Philosophy
The conscience of a Conservative
Goldwater, Barry M. (Barry Morris)
Conservatism -- United States; United States -- Politics and government -- 20th century
American leaders have not shown a comparable solicitude for our
security needs. After the Second World War, the United States had a
conventional military establishment rivaling the Soviet Union’s, and an
absolute monopoly in nuclear power. The former weapon we hastily and
irresponsibly dismantled. The latter we failed to exploit politically,
and then we proceeded to fritter away our lead by belated entry into
the hydrogen bomb and guided missile fields. The result is that we
are out-classed in the conventional means for waging land warfare;
regarding nuclear weapons, we are approaching the point, if it has not
already been reached, where Communist power is equal to our own.
To the impending physical parity in nuclear weapons must be added a
psychological factor assiduously cultivated by Communist propaganda.
The horrors of all-out warfare are said to be so great that no nation
would consider resorting to nuclear weapons unless under direct attack
by those same weapons. Now the moment our leaders really accept this,
strategic nuclear weapons will be neutralized and Communist armies
will be able to launch limited wars without fear of retaliation by our
Strategic Air Command. I fear they are coming to accept it, and thus
that a military and psychological situation is fast developing in which
aggressive Communist forces will be free to maneuver under the umbrella
of nuclear terror.
It is in this context that we must view the Communist propaganda
drive for a permanent ban on the testing of nuclear weapons, and the
inclination of our own leaders to go along with the proposal. There are
two preliminary reasons why such proposals ought to be firmly rejected.
First, there is no reliable means of preventing the Communists from
secretly breaking such an agreement. Our most recent tests demonstrated
that underground atomic explosions can be set off without detection.
Secondly, we cannot hope to maintain even an effective _strategic_
deterrent unless we keep our present nuclear arsenal up to date; this
requires testing. But the main point I want to make is that tests
are needed to develop _tactical_ nuclear weapons for possible use
in limited wars. Our military experts have long recognized that for
limited warfare purposes we must have a weapons superiority to offset
the Communists’ manpower superiority. This means we must develop
and perfect a variety of small, clean nuclear weapons; and this in
turn means: testing. The development of such a weapons system is the
only way in which America will be able to fight itself out of the
dilemma--one horn of which is superior Communist manpower, the other,
the impending neutralization of strategic nuclear weapons.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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