Affairs were now settled in Europe. The governments began to emerge a little from the undecided political condition proclaimed by the Holy Alliance. From the beginning of the year 1827, Metternich had felt some uneasiness concerning the proceedings of Russia with regard to the Ottoman Porte, which was likely to be productive of extreme danger to the Austrian influence. If the Russian projects were realised, Austria would see herself deprived of her ascendancy over the Porte, which was nearly as old as that of France. At this time Metternich caused the French ministry to be sounded, but he was hardly listened to, for the most decided negotiations were in progress between the three cabinets of Russia, London, and Paris, on the Greek question; and here it is well to explain the refusal of Metternich to interfere with the transactions which led to the treaty of July 1827. Since the year 1824, the cause of the Greeks had assumed a degree of consistency and a European character. Every era has its policy of sentiments, and people were now infatuated with a classic fanaticism for the Greeks. No doubt there was something glorious in the heroism which strove to burst the chain of the barbarians; but the enthusiastic declarations of Russia, her strong and pressing despatches in favour of the Greeks, were, in their main object, less the expression of a religious sympathy than the proceedings of a skilful policy, which sought to abase the Ottoman Porte, in order subsequently to reduce it into a state of vassalage. Russia, therefore, applied to Charles X., by speaking of the cross which had brought salvation to the world. In England it roused into action the Greek committee, and it was under the influence of these philanthropic prepossessions that the treaty of July 1827, and the battle of Navarino, which was the consequence of it, led to serious uneasiness on the part of Metternich. This minister instantly divined the full consequences of this shortsighted policy. The battle of Navarino, by crippling the power of the Porte, killed it, in a political sense, for the advantage of Russia: it was the prelude to the campaign of 1828 to the Balkan. Russia had succeeded in getting M. de la Ferronays placed at the head of foreign affairs in France: he was an honest man, but rather Russian in his inclinations and habits; consequently, Metternich could not draw France into a scheme of confederation and armed league against Russia. He was more fortunate in England with the Duke of Wellington, who acknowledged the mistake into which Mr. Canning had fallen, and pronounced the battle of Navarino _an untoward event_. England had thus returned to a perfect understanding of which were her real interests.