In September and October, 1864, when our delegates were at Quebec, and therefore before there could be any objections raised to the details of the scheme, or to the mode of its adoption, I travelled through six {101} counties, embracing the whole of Cape Breton and two counties in Nova Scotia, and took some trouble to ascertain the state of public opinion as to what was taking place, and was greatly surprised at finding that every one I met, without a solitary exception, from the highest to the lowest, was alarmed at the idea of a union with Canada, and that the combination of political leaders, so far from recommending the scheme, filled their partisans with as much dismay as if the powers of light and darkness were plotting against the public safety. It was evident that unless the greatest tact were exercised, a storm of ignorant prejudice and alarm would be aroused, that would sweep the friends of union out of power, if not out of public life. The profound secrecy preserved by the delegates as to the scheme, until an accomplice turned Queen's evidence, added fuel to the flame, and convinced the most sceptical that there was a second Gunpowder Plot in existence, which was destined to annihilate our local legislature and our provincial rights.[2] {102} This was the situation which confronted Howe when he returned in the autumn from his tour as fishery commissioner. He had written from Newfoundland, on hearing of the conference at Charlottetown: 'I have read the proceedings of the delegates and I am glad to be out of the mess.' At first he listened in silence to the Halifax discussions on both sides of the question. These were non-partisan, since Archibald and McCully, the Liberal leaders, were as much concerned in the result as the Conservative ministers. Howe finally broke silence with the first of his articles in the Halifax _Chronicle_ on 'The Botheration Scheme.' This gave the signal for an agitation which finally bore Nova Scotia to the verge of rebellion. Howe's course has been censured as the greatest blot upon an otherwise brilliant career. In justice to his memory the whole situation should be examined. He did not start the agitation. Many able and patriotic Nova Scotians urged him on. Favourable to union as an abstract theory he had been: to Confederation as a policy he had never distinctly pledged himself. The idea that the Quebec terms were sacrosanct, and that hostility to them involved disloyalty to the Empire, must be put aside. It is neither {103} necessary nor fair to assume that Howe's conduct was wholly inspired by the spleen and jealousy commonly ascribed to him; for, with many others, he honestly held the view that the interests of his native province were about to be sacrificed in a bad bargain. Nevertheless, his was a grave political error--an error for which he paid bitterly--which in the end cost him popularity, private friendship, and political reputation.