Finally, we have a class of persons, who, from no impatience of the subject, and from no indifference to the welfare of the aborigines, will oppose the policy of seclusion, as an anomaly not to be tolerated in our form of government. These are men who cannot bear, that, from any assumed necessity or for any supposed advantage, exception should be made of any class of inhabitants, or in respect to any portion of territory, to the rule of uniform rights and responsibilities, and of absolute freedom of movement, contract, and intercourse, the whole nation and the whole land over. Were the Indians ten times as numerous, were their claims to consideration stronger by no matter how much, and were the importance to them of seclusion far more clear than it appears, these political philosophers would steadily oppose the scheme. They might regret the mischiefs which would result to the Indian from exposure to corrupting influences; they might be disposed to favor the most liberal allowances from the public treasury, in compensation to him for his lands, and for his industrial endowment: but they would none the less relentlessly insist that the red man should take his equal chance with white and black, with all the privileges and all the responsibilities of political manhood. In view of the likelihood that the expediency of Indian citizenship will thus become at an early date a practical legislative question, it seems desirable in the connection to state the constitutional relations of the subject. The judicial decisions are somewhat confused, although, from the date (1831) of the decision of Chief-Justice Marshall in the Cherokee Nation vs. the State of Georgia (5 Peters, 1), to that (1870) of the decision in the Cherokee Tobacco (11 Wallace, 616), there has been a marked progress (note especially the decision of Chief-Justice Taney in the United States vs. Rogers, 4 Howard, 567) towards the stronger affirmation of the complete and sufficient sovereignty of the United States. Yet in December, 1870, the Judiciary Committee of the Senate, Carpenter presenting the Report, after an incomplete, and in some respects an inaccurate and inconsequential[M] recital of judicial opinions, made the following startling announcement:-- "Inasmuch as the Constitution treats Indian tribes as belonging to the rank of nations capable of making treaties, it is evident that an act of Congress which should assume to treat the members of a tribe as subject to the municipal jurisdiction of the United States would be unconstitutional and void."