[25] In writing this section I had primarily in view the doctrine set forth in Mr. Spencer’s _Social Statics_. As Mr. Spencer has restated his view and replied to my arguments in his _Data of Ethics_, it is necessary for me to point out that the first paragraph of this section is not directed against such a view of ‘Absolute’ and ‘Relative’ Ethics as is given in the later treatise--which seems to me to differ materially from the doctrine of _Social Statics_. In _Social Statics_ it is maintained not merely--as in the _Data of Ethics_--that Absolute Ethics which “formulates normal conduct in an ideal society” ought to “take precedence of Relative Ethics”; but that Absolute Ethics is the only kind of Ethics with which a philosophical moralist can possibly concern himself. To quote Mr. Spencer’s words:--“Any proposed system of morals which recognises existing defects, and countenances acts made needful by them, stands self-condemned.... Moral law ... requires as its postulate that human beings be perfect. The philosophical moralist treats solely of the _straight_ man ... shows in what relationship he stands to other straight men ... a problem in which a _crooked_ man forms one of the elements, is insoluble by him.” _Social Statics_ (chap. i.). Still more definitely is Relative Ethics excluded in the following passage of the concluding chapter of the same treatise (the italics are mine):--“It will very likely be urged that, whereas the perfect moral code is confessedly beyond the fulfilment of imperfect men, some other code is needful for our present guidance ... to say that the imperfect man requires a moral code which recognises his imperfection and allows for it, _seems at first sight reasonable_. _But it is not really so_ ... a system of morals which shall recognise man’s present imperfections and allow for them _cannot be devised; and would be useless if it could be devised_.” [26] I omit, for the present, the consideration of the method which takes Perfection as an ultimate end: since, as has been before observed, it is hardly possible to discuss this satisfactorily, in relation to the present question, until it has been somewhat more clearly distinguished from the ordinary Intuitional Method. [27] Some further consideration of this question will be found in a subsequent chapter. Cf. Book iv. chap. iv. § 2. CHAPTER III ETHICAL JUDGMENTS