The Nineteenth and Their Times: Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served — John Shaqi
The Nineteenth and Their Times: Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They ServedBiddulph, J. (John)
History
The Nineteenth and Their Times: Being an Account of the Four Cavalry Regiments in the British Army That Have Borne the Number Nineteen and of the Campaigns in Which They Served
Biddulph, J. (John)
Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Light Dragoons, 1786-1821; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Regiment, 1759-1763; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 19th Regiment, 1779-1783; Great Britain. Army. Cavalry. 23rd Light Dragoons, 1781-1786; Great Britain. Army. Royal Hussars, 19th (Queen Alexandra's Own)
corresponding desire for peace on the side of the Governor and
Council, and Lord Macartney’s behaviour was disingenuous. Burgoyne
asked for explanations to some parts of the Select Committee’s
letter, which he discussed generally. Lord Macartney would give no
direct answer, and was very guarded in what he said. He was only a
Member of the Government, not authorized to decide, but only to speak
their sentiments, and to represent matters to the other Members.
Would Sir John put down in writing what questions he pleased, he
would engage to lay them before the Select Committee, and obtain
replies to them. Lord Macartney’s intention was to obtain the same
control over the King’s troops, as he exercised over the Company’s
troops. To gain this end he was resolved to give the command to a
Company’s officer, who would naturally be more pliable than a King’s
officer, though it was a recognised principle with the British
Government to keep the command of the King’s troops under an officer
of their own appointment. It is almost incredible that this miserable
quarrel should have gone on at a time of the greatest public
distress, when Tippoo was triumphant in the field, and it was still
uncertain that the Mahrattas would not take up arms again.
Stuart was, shortly afterwards, shipped off to England under close
arrest, in a ship specially purchased for the purpose, though, for
want of funds, the pay of the troops was in some instances over two
years in arrears. During imprisonment, he was denied the use of pen
and ink, and was only allowed to see Burgoyne on public business
in presence of the officer on duty over him. At the time of his
embarkation, he believed that it was intended to put him to death at
sea.
Burgoyne assumed the command of the King’s troops without further
direct opposition, but the Council lost no opportunity of thwarting
him and lowering his authority, while they encouraged others to
resist it. Burgoyne, on his part, cast moderation aside, and was
bent on pushing his claims to extremity. He ignored General Lang,
and issued orders that clashed with those of the civil government,
producing confusion, perplexity, and relaxation of discipline in
every rank. The Major Generals, who had joined in signing the
protest against Lang’s promotion, and several others among the
officers commanding regiments withdrew their support from Burgoyne.
In October, Burgoyne placed Lieutenant Colonel Sterling of the
36th under arrest for disobedience of orders: the Select Committee
released him. The soldiers too had their grievances about batta which
should have been paid to them, but was withheld by Lord Macartney.
The men of the 98th were on the eve of mutiny, and the men of
Burgoyne’s own regiment formed the project of going to the Fort in a
body to ask redress. Burgoyne sternly repressed both movements, but
the Select Committee gave him credit for causing them. A fresh crisis
in the quarrel was inevitable.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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