"I would do Mr. James an injustice, however, to stop here. His real doctrine, I think, is that a belief is true when it satisfies _both_ the personal needs _and_ the requirements of objective things. Speaking of pragmatism, he says, 'Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of _leading us_, what fits every part of life best _and combines with the collectivity of experience's demands_, nothing being omitted'. And again, 'That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously its function of satisfying _our double urgency_'. (p. 64). It does not appear certain from the context that this 'double urgency' is that of the personal and the objective demands, but it is probable.... On this basis, the 'in so far forth' of the truth of the absolute because of the comfort it supplies, means that _one_ of the two conditions which need to be satisfied has been met, so that if the absolute met the other one also it would be quite true. I have no doubt that this is Mr. James' meaning, and it sufficiently safeguards him from charges that pragmatism means that anything that is agreeable is true. At the same time, I do not think, in logical strictness, that satisfying one of two tests, when satisfaction of both is required, can be said to constitute a belief true even 'in so far forth'". CHAPTER IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION. Writing as a scientist and publishing his work in a scientific journal, Peirce proposed in 1878 a new method for making our ideas clear. He was attempting a description of the logic of the sciences. He believed himself to be showing how the greatest of our modern thinkers do make clear to themselves their ideas of the objects with which they work. The meaning of anything, said Peirce, consists in the actual or possible effects which it might produce. Our idea of the thing is clear when we have in mind these sensible effects. This theory of clearness he called pragmatism.