The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and DeweyGeyer, Denton Loring
Philosophy
The pragmatic theory of truth as developed by Peirce, James, and Dewey
Geyer, Denton Loring
Dewey, John, 1859-1952; James, William, 1842-1910; Peirce, Charles S. (Charles Sanders), 1839-1914; Pragmatism
Now the difficulty in Peirce's method, as we have seen, was that this
postulate of an external reality unaffected by our opinions would not
endure the test for clearness. Every object, says Peirce, reduces to
the sum of its effects. The only effect of real things, he says again,
is to produce belief. From these two propositions it would seem to
follow that reality is a sum of beliefs. But this, of course,
eliminates any unchanging reality independent of our opinions about
it.
We saw further that Peirce defined both belief and meaning as habit
and made no distinction between them. Now as belief and meaning are
obviously not the same, we are in need of new definitions for these
terms.
At this point we turned to the interpretation of Dewey. For Dewey the
distinction would seem to be that while meaning may well be defined as
habit, belief is to be defined as expectation. If we believe in
anything, this means that we expect certain results from it. To
believe is to suppose that if we were to come into relation with the
thing we would find certain effects to come about.
From this conception the Deweyan theory of truth would seem to follow
immediately. If belief means a sum of expectations, the truth of a
belief would mean the verification of these expectations. A true
belief simply means one that fulfils expectations.
The Deweyan development of the pragmatic method is obviously very much
more in harmony with the procedure of science than that of James.
James seems to have 'left the track' in his interpretation of the
pragmatic method when he related truth to the predominantly valuable.
Truth we have found to have no necessary or invariable connection with
general value, for many ideas would be acknowledged to be perfectly
true while at the same time being either useless or harmful. For Dewey
this matter of value has no place in relation to the test of the truth
of an idea, for its truth means nothing more than its ability to lead
as it promises.
We seem, then, it may be said in conclusion, to be confronted with
something like the following alternatives:
If we believe that Dewey could not have made a correct deduction from
the pragmatic method when he developed it into a theory of truth
making truth dependent upon fulfilled expectations alone, then very
obviously the next step in this investigation is to find the point at
which his inference went wrong. This means a re-examination of each
step in his reasoning.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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