The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 1 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
The Austrian frontiers are nowhere simple, but ever since the
conclusion of the Triple Alliance she has turned her attention—in a
military sense—almost exclusively to her Russian frontier. On glancing
at the map, one’s first thought is that the natural boundary between
the two countries should run along the Carpathian range, but the actual
frontier is a long way on the Russian side of it. Galicia forms, so to
speak, a glacis of this main obstacle (the Carpathians) running down
towards Russia, and it has recently grown up into a splendidly prepared
entrenched camp, connected to the other provinces of Austro-Hungary by
numerous roads across the Carpathians. It is strongly fortified and
stocked with supplies of every nature, both for a protracted defence or
an advance in force into Russia. Austria can now concentrate 1,000,000
men in this area within a very short space of time. For 760 miles we
have a common frontier, and the upper reaches of the Vistula—from
Nepolomnitsa to Zavikhost—and a small stretch of the Dniester, with its
tributary, the Zbruoz, form a natural boundary in this direction. These
rivers, however, possess no strategic value. The frontier is crossed by
four lines of railway:
(_a_) At Granitsa, on the Warsaw-Ivangorod line.
(_b_) At Radziviloff.
(_c_) At Volochisk.
(_d_) At Novoselits.
Our economic relations with Austro-Hungary are not so important as
those with Germany. For the five years 1893–97 the average value of our
trade has amounted to only £5,800,000 per annum, or 4·5 per cent. of
our total trade; of this, the exports are £3,500,000, and the imports
£2,320,000 (4·8 and 4·2 per cent. of the respective totals). In 1897
our exports were £3,900,000, and imports £19,000,000. Though almost
half the races of Austro-Hungary come of kindred stock to our people,
and though much of our blood was shed in the nineteenth century in
order to maintain the reigning house of Austria on the throne, war
between the two nations is by no means impossible in the event of a
general European conflagration, for brothers by blood and religion
will march against brothers. Such a war, which would, except in the
imagination of a few Polish dreamers, be a calamity for all the Slav
races, could not be popular with the Austrian-Germans, however much
their interests may be opposed to ours. In Austro-Hungary it is the
Hungarians and Poles alone who hate us, having, as is well known, many
and good reasons for siding with our possible foes. Upon the subject of
a change of our frontier after war with Austria, I wrote in my report
of 1900 as follows:
“In the event of a successful war with us, the Austro-Hungarian
Government—under pressure from the Poles—would probably insist on
the annexation to Galicia of those Russian border-lands where the
Poles predominate. Some of the Polish and Hungarian patriots even
aspire to moving the Russian frontier back to Brest and the Dnieper.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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