The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far EastKuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
History
The Russian Army and the Japanese War, Vol. 2 (of 2): Being Historical and Critical Comments on the Military Policy and Power of Russia and on the Campaign in the Far East
Kuropatkin, A. N. (Alekseĭ Nikolaevich)
Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905
“Our lack of success may have been due, in part, to various
and complicated causes, to the misconduct of particular
persons, to bad generalship, to lack of preparation in the
army and the navy, to inadequacy of material resources, and to
misappropriations in the departments of equipment and supply;
but the principal reason for our defeat lies deeper, and is to
be found in lack of patriotism, and in the absence of a feeling
of duty toward and love for the Fatherland. In a conflict
between two peoples, the things of most importance are not
material resources, but moral strength, exaltation of spirit,
and patriotism. Victory is most likely to be achieved by the
nation in which these qualities are most highly developed.
Japan had long been preparing for war with us; all her people
desired it; and a feeling of lofty patriotism pervaded the
whole country. In her army and her fleet, therefore, every
man, from the Commander-in-Chief to the last soldier, not
only knew what he was fighting for, and what he might have
to die for, but understood clearly that upon success in the
struggle depended the fate of Japan, her political importance,
and her future in the history of the world. Every soldier
knew also that the whole nation stood behind him. Japanese
mothers and wives sent their sons and husbands to the war with
enthusiasm, and were proud when they died for their country.
With us, on the other hand, the war was unpopular from the
very beginning. We neither desired it nor anticipated it,
and consequently we were not prepared for it. Soldiers were
hastily put into railway-trains, and when, after a journey that
lasted a month, they alighted in Manchuria, they did not know
in what country they were, nor whom they were to fight, nor
what the war was about. Even our higher commanders went to the
front unwillingly, and from a mere sense of duty. The whole
army, moreover, felt that it was regarded by the country with
indifference; that its life was not shared by the people; and
that it was a mere fragment, cut off from the nation, thrown to
a distance of 6,000 miles, and there abandoned to the caprice
of Fate. Before decisive fighting began, therefore, one of
the contending armies advanced with the full expectation and
confident belief that it would be victorious, while the other
went forward with a demoralizing doubt of its own success.”
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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