To this may be added one important circumstance. It is manifest that if it was considered necessary to come to some definite conclusion before the existence of the Communique, it was on account of the binding nature of the final agreement. It is evident that the Swedish government has endeavoured to secure the surest guarantee from a Swedish point of view, that Norway, of her own accord, would make no changes in respect to the Foreign Administration. Now the negotiation on the vital contents of the laws, were _succeeded_ by this, and there is strong reason to suppose that the Swedish negotiators expressed their hopes of an eventual termination of the negotiations with respect to the detailed decisions of the laws, _under the express supposition_ that safe guarantee would be granted by the Norwegians, against a one-sided disturbance of the Status quo in reference to the Foreign Minister. As meanwhile, through the interpretation which the Norwegian side chose to give the Communique, these--to Sweden--very desirable guarantees became an illusion, it may very reasonably be asked if the Norwegian side was entitled to exact too much from the Swedish delegate's possible optimism respecting the prospects of coming to a definite conclusion on the rest of the points. Further demonstrations for the manifestation of the baseless grounds of the moral indignation which was eventually to give the Norwegian revolution an essential justification before an enlightened public, are unnessary. The terrible breach of agreement, on the part of Sweden, which was trumpeted all over Europe, on closer examination, vanishes into thin air. FOOTNOTES: [41:1] NANSEN (page 76): "The Swedish draft contained a number of demands quite unacceptable to Norway as they were opposed to the very basis and object of the negotiations." [45:1] Different drafts of laws were especially to be discussed in this way. These outlines are, however, characterised by the ever well informed Norwegian politician Mr C. BERNER as "quite preliminary". [45:2] In an earlier stage of the negotiations, the Norwegian Cabinet were evidently not under the impression that the most important of these preliminary negotiations was brought to a successful conclusion. C. BERNER says--in the Storthing debate Feb. 13th 1904--he had heard both from Norwegian and Swedish negotiators that to frame this laws in a quite satisfactory manner would be a very difficult thing. VI. [Sidenote: _Norwegian policy after the grounding of the Consular negotiations._]