The United States and Latin AmericaLatané, John Holladay
History
The United States and Latin America
Latané, John Holladay
Latin America -- Foreign relations -- United States; United States -- Foreign relations -- Latin America
as full vigor as if she had still a practical hold over her colonies and
a navy to enforce her pretensions, "no man will say that under such
circumstances our recognition of those states can be indefinitely
postponed."[48]
While Great Britain was thus considering the expediency of following the
example of the United States in the recognition of Spain's revolted
colonies, the powers of central Europe had taken upon them the task of
solving the difficulties of that unfortunate country both at home and in
America. The restored rule of the Bourbons in Spain had been far from
satisfactory to the great mass of the people. In March, 1820, the army
which Ferdinand had assembled at Cadiz to be sent against the rebellious
colonies, suddenly turned against the government, refused to embark, and
demanded the restoration of the constitution of 1812. The action of the
army was everywhere approved and sustained by the mass of the people,
and the king was forced to proclaim the constitution and to swear to
uphold it. The March revolution in Spain was followed in July by a
constitutional movement in Naples, and in August of the same year by a
similar movement in Portugal; while the next year saw the outbreak of
the Greek struggle for independence. Thus in all three of the peninsulas
of Southern Europe the people were struggling for the right of
self-government. The movement in Greece was, it is true, of an
altogether different character from the others, but it was a revolt
against constituted authority and therefore incurred the ill-will of the
so-called legitimists. The powers of Europe at once took alarm at the
rapid spread of revolutionary ideas and proceeded to adopt measures for
the suppression of the movements to which these ideas gave rise. The
principle of joint intervention on the part of allied governments in the
internal affairs of European states had been developed in the years
immediately following the overthrow of Napoleon and was the outcome of
the wholly anomalous condition in which he had left the politics of
Europe. In the hands of Prince Metternich, the genius of reaction
against French revolutionary ideas, this principle had become the most
powerful weapon of absolutism and now threatened the subversion of
popular institutions throughout Europe.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account