Great Britain, meanwhile, had devoted her main attention to the trade and diplomacy and little wars associated with the maintenance of a world-empire and, in self-defense, had cultivated friendships with Russia and France and the United States and Japan as this German power began to come closer and touch the most vital British interests. France naturally strengthened itself as its historic enemy grew in power; Russia improved her military position after the Japanese was as she was bound to do; Germany appeared to set the pace upon sea and land with an aggressive diplomacy in Morocco and in China, at Paris and at St. Petersburg, which was bound to cause trouble and to promote what is commonly called militarism. The vast ambitions and persistent policy of the German ruler and his people, the unsatisfied characteristics of German diplomacy, the militant ideals and military preparations and naval expansion of Germany between 1900 and 1914 became the dominant consideration in the chancelleries of Europe. Armies and navies, wars in the Balkans or struggles for colonial spheres of influence, financial reserves and naval construction and volunteer forces—all came to be measured against current developments in this center of European gravity. GREAT BRITAIN’S PEACE EFFORTS Great Britain tried to hold aloof from this international rivalry, this preparation for a war which her people and leaders hoped against hope would be averted. Royal visits of a pacific character were exchanged, parties of Great Britain’s business men visited Berlin, while leaders such as King Edward and Lord Haldane exercised all their ability in striving for some mutual ground of friendly action. Lovers of peace wrote many volumes and filled many newspapers with articles on the beneficence of that policy and the terrors of militarism—books and articles which were never seen in Germany except by those who regarded them as so many confessions of national weakness. Between 1904 and 1908 Great Britain actually reduced her naval expenditures and limited her construction of battleships in the hope that Germany would follow the lead, pleaded at two Hague Conferences for international reduction of armaments, kept away from all increase in her own almost ridiculous military establishment, urged upon two occasions (in 1912–1913) a naval holiday in construction. The following figures from Brassey’s authoritative NAVAL ANNUAL shows that her naval expenditure upon new ships in 1913 was actually less than in 1904, that Germany’s was nearly three times greater, that France and Russia and Italy had doubled theirs: