Theory & History of HistoriographyCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Theory & History of Historiography
Croce, Benedetto
Historiography
Not only, therefore, is history unable to discriminate between facts
that are good and facts that are evil, and between epochs that are
progressive and those that are regressive, but it does not begin until
the psychological conditions which rendered possible such antitheses
have been superseded and substituted by an act of the spirit, which
seeks to ascertain what function the fact or the epoch previously
condemned has fulfilled--that is to say, what it has produced of its
own in the course of development, and therefore what it has produced.
And since all facts and epochs are productive in their own way, not
only is not one of them to be condemned in the light of history, but
all are to be praised and venerated. A condemned fact, a fact that is
repugnant, is not yet a historical proposition, it is hardly even the
premiss of a historical problem to be formulated. A negative history is
a non-history so long as its negative process substitutes itself for
thought, which is affirmative, and does not maintain itself within its
practical and moral bounds and limit itself to poetical expressions and
empirical modes of representation, in respect of all of which we can
certainly speak (speak and not think), as we do speak at every moment,
of bad men and periods of decadence and regression.
If the vice of negative history arises from the separation, the
solidification, and the opposition of the dialectical antitheses
of good and evil and the transformation of the ideal moments of
development into entities, that other deviation of history which
may be known as elegiac history arises from the misunderstanding of
another necessity of that conception--that is to say, the perpetual
constancy, the perpetual conservation of what has been acquired. But
this is also false by definition. What is preserved and enriched
in the course of history is history itself, spirituality. The past
does not live otherwise than in the present, as the force of the
present, resolved and transformed in the present. Every particular
form, individual, action, institution, work, thought, is destined to
perish: even art, which is called eternal (and is so in a certain
sense), perishes, for it does not live, save to the extent that it
is reproduced, and therefore transfigured and surrounded with new
light, in the spirit of posterity. Finally, truth itself perishes,
particular and determined truth, because it is not rethinkable, save
when included in the system of a vaster truth, and therefore at the
same time transformed. But those who do not rise to the conception of
pure historical consideration, those who attach themselves with their
whole soul to an individual, a work, a belief, an institution, and
attach themselves so strongly that they cannot separate themselves
from it in order to objectify it before themselves and think it, are
prone to attribute the immortality which belongs to the spirit in
universal to the spirit in one of its particular and determined forms;
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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