that the right of prosecution may be confined to such hands, and its use to such a procedure as will afford the British merchant a guarantee against private, malicious, secretly conducted attacks, and will make his personal security something more than a mockery. I make this appeal with the same confidence in the result, which my conscience felt when I stood before the British Jury, into whose hands it pleased Providence, by so unexpected a proceeding, to place, in point of fact, my very existence--the existence of all that is dear to me on earth--of much that the world has had opportunities to try and has stamped as honourable in character--of much, not the less valuable because the world can never know of it--the Jury upon whose verdict hung the honour of this country--a country for whose honour and estimation among the nations of the earth I must feel strongly--and from which a gross and cruel injustice would be doubly felt, bound to it as I am by those ties, which it has been attempted barbarously to tear asunder, but which it is only in the power of God to dissolve. P. DE ZULUETA. _London, 17th January, 1844._ OPINIONS OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITIES _Referred to in_ p. lxii. “1 & 2. There is not any thing in the Act of Parliament in question which renders illegal a commercial dealing on the coast of Africa, in usual lawful merchandise, though such dealing may be with a person known to gain his livelihood by dealing in slaves, and therefore of course, an owner or supercargo making a sale in the manner described to any such person, does not subject himself or the ship to any of the penalties of the Act. “3. Independently of the above Act, an English owner, or master, or supercargo, or other person who engages in such commercial dealing as above described, is not guilty of any offence against the law, nor subject to any punishment. (signed) “_Fred. Pollock._” “Temple, 8 June, 1842. (_Vide Report, West Coast of Africa, Part I_, p. 344.) * * * * * “1. Unless the merchant knew, when he sold the goods, that they were used for carrying on the slave trade, I am clearly of opinion that he is not guilty of felony. The question of knowledge will be for the Jury, if the case is tried by a Jury, or by a Judge or Judges without a Jury, and will depend upon the evidence that is given either of direct knowledge, or that the circumstances were such that he must have known the destination and occupation of the vessel and her crew. “2. It will appear from the statutes 11th and 12th, and 46th of Geo. III, c. 54, &c., that the merchant might be tried at Sierra Leone, and if so, I am disposed to think that the constituted authorities at Cape Coast would be warranted in apprehending him and sending him for trial to Sierra Leone, as the offence committed is felony.