[10] A summary of the report of the Commission is to be found in _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 3140 (London, 1903), pp. 26 _et seq._ A statement of its membership and purposes is given in the _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1899, p. 9. [11] _Report of the Anatolian Railway Company_, 1897, p. 3. [12] _Alldeutsche Blätter_, December 17, 1899. It should be borne in mind, however, that until the Bagdad Railway concession was granted French financiers held the lead in the number of kilometres of railway in operation or contracted for. The situation in 1898 was as follows: _British_ Kiloms. Smyrna-Aidin 373 Mersina-Adana 67 —- Total 440 _French_ Kiloms. Smyrna-Cassaba 512 Jaffa-Jerusalem 87 Beirut-Damascus 247 Damascus-Aleppo 420 ——- Total 1,266 _German_ Kiloms. Haidar Pasha-Ismid 91 Ismid-Angora 485 Eski Shehr-Konia 444 ——- Total 1,020 All of the British and German lines were in operation in 1898, whereas the French Syrian Railways were only partially completed. [13] _Statistisches Handbuch für das deutsche Reich_, Volume 2, pp. 506, 510; _Diplomatic and Consular Reports_, No. 2950 (1902), pp. 5, 23; _Turkey in Europe_, No. 16 of the Foreign Office Handbooks, pp. 86–87. [14] J. Riesser, _Die deutschen Grossbanken und ihre Konzentration im Zusammenhang mit der Entwicklung der Gesamtwirtschaft in Deutschland_ (third edition, Jena, 1909); translated into English and published as Senate Document No. 593, Sixty-first Congress, Second Session, 1911. References here given are to the translation. In this connection _cf._ “The Oversea and Foreign Business of the German Credit Banks,” pp. 420 _et seq._ [15] _Syria and Palestine_, p. 126; _The Times_, October 28, 1898, August 2 and 16, 1899. [16] Karl Helfferich, _Die deutsche Türkenpolitik_ (Berlin, 1921), pp. 10 _et seq._; J. A. R. Marriot, _The Eastern Question_ (Oxford, 1917), pp. 347 _et seq._ [17] L. Ostrorog, _The Turkish Problem_ (London, 1919), pp. 52–53; E. Dutemple, _En Turquie d’Asie_ (Paris, 1883), pp. 131 _et seq._ [18] For a biographical account of General von der Goltz (1843–1916) _cf._ F. W. Wile, _Men Around the Kaiser_ (Philadelphia, 1913), Chapter XXVI. Bismarck consented to the appointment of von der Goltz’s military mission—which was not in accord with his general Eastern policy—as a sort of insurance against the possibility that chauvinism, Pan-Slavism, and anti-German elements in Russia should gain the ascendancy at the court of the Tsar. In such an event it might be possible to utilize Turkish bayonets and Turkish artillery, especially if they had been trained by Prussian officers. _Memoirs of Prince Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst_ (English translation, New York, 1906), Volume II, p. 268. [19] _Recueil d’actes internationaux de l’Empire Ottoman_, Volume IV (1903), Document No. 960.