The reader will appreciate at a glance the real opinion of the American Commander-in-Chief as to his own immediate future, and the general scope of operations which he regarded as supremely important in behalf of American Independence. He understood thoroughly, that Lord Dartmouth originally opposed the military occupation of Boston in order to prevent a collision between British troops and the excited people, which he regarded as an inevitable result. That distinguished and far-sighted statesman, in order to prevent any overt acts of resistance to the established representatives of the crown at business or social centres, wrote to Lord Howe as early as October 22, 1775, to “gain possession of some respectable port to the southward, from which to make sudden and unexpected attacks upon sea-coast towns during the winter.” But British pride had forced the increase of the army in Massachusetts Colony, and initiated a disastrous campaign. Lord Dartmouth never wavered in the opinion that New York was the only proper base of operations in dealing with the Colonies at large. Lord Howe himself had advised that New York, instead of Boston, should be made the rendezvous and headquarters of all British troops to be sent to America. Only the contumacy of General Gage had baffled the wiser plans of superior authority. During the first week of the new year, and while the American army was under the stress of reconstruction, Washington learned that General Clinton had been promised an independent command of a portion of the fresh troops which accompanied Admiral Shuldham to America, and would be detailed on some important detached service remote from New England waters. As a remarkable fact, not creditable to the king’s advisers, the Island of New York, at that time, was practically without any regular military garrison; but its aristocratic tory circles of influence could not conceive of a popular uprising against the supremacy of George III. within their favored sphere of luxury and independence. Washington appreciated the situation fully. He recognized the defenceless condition of New York and its adaptation for the Headquarters of the Army of America. He was also thoroughly convinced that General Clinton’s proposed expedition would either occupy New York, or make the attempt to do so. He acted without delay upon that conviction, although reserving to himself the responsibility of first reducing Boston with the least possible delay. General Lee, then upon detached service in Connecticut, had written to him, urging, in his emphatic style, “the immediate occupation of New York; the suppression or expulsion of certain tories of Long Island; and that not to crush the serpents before their rattles were grown, would be ruinous.”