On the thirty-first of December, the house again resolved itself into a committee of the whole on a bill from the senate providing for the raising of twenty-five thousand troops. Mr. Breckenridge being in the chair, an opportunity was furnished Mr. Clay to express his views in relation to it, which he embraced. Among those in favor of war in the house, much diversity of opinion prevailed in regard to the number of men it was desirable to raise. Many were in favor of fifteen thousand only――a force in his estimation by far too small to meet the exigences which had then arisen, and would be likely to arise. The secretary of war, in his report, had stated that at least twelve thousand troops would be wanted for the sole purpose of garrisoning the fortresses on the sea-board. During the progress of the proposed war, it might be deemed important to attack and subjugate Quebec in Canada, in which case it would be necessary, he contended, to post in the various military stations of strength on the route, a considerable number of men, to retain their possession. Allowances he thought should be made for the various contingences probable to occur, always incident to the operations of an army, and calculated to diminish their number. Even if the projected invasion of the British Provinces should be abandoned, Mr. Clay contended that the single circumstance of the immense extent of frontier to be guarded, rendered it obvious that twenty-five thousand men would constitute a force by no means too large. Inasmuch as it was the painful but imperative duty of America to strike the blow, he was in favor of so concentrating her energies, that when it fell, there would remain no necessity for its repetition. Subsequent events have proved his policy both wise and sagacious.