The men who composed it had picked up the Executive when it fell from the Empire’s hands, only for the purpose of not letting it fall into the gutter, and for using it to defend the country against the invaders. These men certainly had the confidence of Europe, and their Government was immediately and gladly recognised by all the Powers; it had been recognised and respected even by the enemy. But side by side with this _de facto_ Executive there also remained the débris of the fallen Government, which had by no means renounced its past, and still lived in the hope of coming back and again laying hands on the Crown, which though fallen they still thought unbroken. On the other side there were demagogues, orators and low-class politicians, all that unhealthy ferment which had burst out on the 31st of October and nearly overthrown the National Defence Government. The latter, it is true, had conquered this first revolt, but the pretensions and aspirations of the party which had caused the rising were not conquered. They were only pushed out of the way and reduced to silence, but they still smouldered in the ashes and no one knew when they might not break out afresh, or whether the Government would again be as fortunate in reducing them to impotence and maintaining its authority. This is what seriously preoccupied foreign statesmen and inspired them with the idea of creating a “legal representative,” in any manner whatever, by any means and at any price. Above all they wanted to guard against unexpected surprises. Before all and above all they wanted to have an authority to deal with, which was not only a Government _de facto_ but a Government that had been consecrated--even if only apparently--by the votes of the French people, and that could by that token be accepted by all parties and be safe from sudden attacks and ambushes. This is why Lord Granville first asked me to have recourse to the Conseils Généraux of the Empire, and when I showed him the impossibility of such a solution, this is why he suggested that we should simply hold the Elections without any armistice, by carrying them through as quickly as possible. I should have liked to show him again how unfair and impossible I considered his proposition, but it would have been preaching in the wilderness, and so all I said was: “What would you do in the provinces that are invaded and occupied by the enemy?” The noble lord’s answer showed me, more than anything I have said up till now, what were the thoughts which exclusively obsessed him. Lord Granville was not embarrassed by my question. He thought one could simply get the votes of the yet unoccupied provinces, and that that would be enough to obtain a “Representation of the Nation.” I began to have less and less understanding of the Minister’s arguments, and carried away by feelings which I had difficulty in controlling, I answered with spirit: “No, M. le Comte, France will never hold Elections in such a manner.”