I pointed out to Lord Granville that he himself knew the situation sufficiently well to foresee that the result of direct negotiations with the General Staff at Versailles could only be negative. “Besides,” I said, “the question which I have taken the liberty of putting to you had its sole _raison d’être_ in our conversation. The question was born of the moment and is part of a purely personal reflection. It was only suggested to me by my desire to show you how much I have at heart the understanding of the remarks which I have the honour of hearing from your lips.” After Lord Granville’s advice to address ourselves direct to the General Staff at Versailles, it was clear to me that the only wish of the English Government was not to expose itself, to keep strictly and prudently out of the way and to interfere in the negotiations as little as possible--that is to say, to have nothing to do with them. For all this there was a peremptory reason. It was not entirely lack of goodwill, but the fear of compromising themselves. Everywhere I observed this exaggerated fear of being dragged into a conflict with Prussia. At that time I regarded this feeling as one of weakness, but on reflection it seems to me that it must be judged less severely. One cannot arm from one day to another. Moreover, a great Power cannot raise its voice without giving its words the support of arms should it not be listened to. And Prussia, as I have already said, would have listened to nothing, unless it were a general at the head of a strong army. Now England at that time had no army either. She was in a complete state of peace. Besides, had she not been warned by her rebuff from the Prussian General Staff that she had only one thing to do: _keep quiet!_ In fact if Lord Granville thus sent me back to Versailles to re-open negotiations for an armistice it was because “Odo”--that is the Christian name by which he called the Under-Secretary of State, Mr. Odo Russell, who was with the General Staff--had written him that M. de Bismarck would no longer listen to him. “M. Odo,” said he, “wrote to me only yesterday that France had now better approach the General Staff direct and that M. de Bismarck has nothing further to say to me.” It was an irrefutable argument, and the least I could do to repay such frankness was not to insist any more, unless it were openly to ask the Secretary of State that England should go to war. But yet I did not wish to retire. Seeing that Lord Granville still listened to me with interest and appeared in no hurry to terminate our interview, I moved the armchair, on which I was seated and which I had pushed back a little during the last part of our conversation, a little nearer to him. His knees nearly touched mine. I looked at him, trying to read into his blue eyes, and I said:-- “You have received me so kindly that I would like to speak as frankly as you will allow me. I am young, M. le Comte, and I am still younger in diplomacy....”