To this Louis XIII agreed, and gave instructions to Michel de Marillac, Chief of the Finances, to furnish the marshal with the funds he required. But Marillac, not only did not execute this order, but sent in all haste that same evening a courier to warn his brother who, with the Duc d’Angoulême, commanded the army of Champagne, that it was intended to break up their army and send the greater part of it into Italy. These two nobles, who had no desire to be deprived of their command, promptly had recourse to the bogey of a German invasion, and wrote to the King that they had the most positive information that the Imperialists were about to enter France at two points, from Lorraine and the Palatinate; that, in consequence, M. d’Angoulême was about to throw himself into Metz, which he would preserve for the King or die; while M. de Marillac had gone to Verdun, with the intention of defending it to his last gasp; but, as they feared that the forces at their disposal might be insufficient to withstand the invaders, they must entreat his Majesty to send them four regiments of foot and 500 horse with all possible despatch. “Upon this,” says Bassompierre, “the King and his Council, who took all this for Gospel truth, told me that they were unable to withdraw any troops from the Army of Champagne, to which, indeed, they were obliged to send reinforcements; and I, after having endeavoured to make them comprehend that it was an imposture invented to perpetuate the employment of these gentlemen and to involve the King in useless expense, excused myself and refused the troops which they proposed to give me to go to the relief of Italy.” Such troops as could be spared were accordingly entrusted to the Comte de Vignolles, whom Bassompierre says did not arrive at Verrua until the siege of that town had been raised, but this is incorrect.[28]