A history of criticism and literary taste in Europe from the earliest texts to the present day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the Renaissance to the decline of eighteenth century orthodoxySaintsbury, George
History
A history of criticism and literary taste in Europe from the earliest texts to the present day. Volume 2 (of 3), From the Renaissance to the decline of eighteenth century orthodoxy
Saintsbury, George
Criticism -- History; Literature -- History and criticism; Literature, Medieval
When it is examined in detail the proceeding may excite even more
astonishment, which will be wisely directed not more to [Sidenote:
_Historical and symptomatic significance._] the original conception of
it than to the extent to which, from what followed, it seems to have hit
certain peculiarities in the æsthetic sense of mankind as regards
poetry. We may easily go wrong by devoting too much attention to the
fact of Vida’s individual selection of the poet to whom all other poets
are bound _jurare in verba_. It is certain that, from his own day to
this, Virgil has appealed to many tastes—and to some of the
greatest—secure of his result of being pronounced _altissimo poeta_.
Those who like him least cannot but admit that Dante and Tennyson among
poets, that Quintilian and Scaliger—nay, that even Boileau—among
critics, are not precisely negligible quantities. But the real
subject—not merely of astonishment but of reasonable and deliberate
determination to adopt a position of “No Surrender” in the denial of
Vida’s position—is this selection of _any_ poet, no matter who it may
be, as not only a positive pattern of all poetic excellence, but a
negative _index expurgatorius_ of all poetic delinquency. Not Homer, not
Dante, not Shakespeare himself, can be allowed the first position; and
the main principle and axiom of all sound Criticism is, that not merely
no actual poet, but no possible one, can be allowed the second. This
kind of poetical predestination—this fixing of a hard-and-fast type,
within which lies all salvation and without which lies none—is utter
blasphemy against the poetical spirit. Not only will simple imitation of
the means whereby one poet has achieved poetry not suffice to enable
another to achieve it, but this suggestion is by far the least dangerous
part of the doctrine. It will probably lead to the composition of much
bad poetry, but it will not necessarily cause the abortion, or the
mistaking when born, of any that is good. The damnatory clauses of the
creed must have, and did have, this fatal effect.
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