A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, MadridOman, Charles
History
A history of the Peninsular War, Vol. 5, Oct. 1811-Aug. 31, 1812 : $b Valencia, Ciudad Rodrigo, Badajoz, Salamanca, Madrid
Oman, Charles
Peninsular War, 1807-1814
The tale of this part of the battle of Saguntum is lamentable.
There is no record so bad in the whole war: even the Gebora was a
well-contested fight compared with this--and at Belchite the army that
fled so easily gave way before numbers equal or superior to its own,
not inferior in the proportion of one to three. The fact was that the
Valencian troops had a long record of disasters behind them, were
thoroughly demoralized, and could not be trusted for one moment, and
that the Murcians (as Mahy confessed) were not much better. The defeat
was rendered more shameful by the fact that the smaller half of Blake’s
Army, the ‘Expeditionary Force,’ was at the same moment making head
in good style against numbers rather larger than its own, and seemed
for a moment about to achieve a splendid success. If the Spanish left,
17,000 strong, could have ‘contained’ half its own strength, if it
could have kept 8,000 instead of 4,000 French employed for one hour,
Blake might have relieved Saguntum and driven off Suchet. But the story
is disgraceful. Mahy wrote next morning to Blake, ‘I must tell you,
with my usual bluntness, that you had better sell the horses of this
cavalry, and draft the men into the infantry. I could not have believed
in the possibility of such conduct, if I had not seen it with my own
eyes take place and cost us so much[32].’ Blake actually gave orders
for one hussar regiment (a Murcian one) to be deprived of its horses
and drafted out. But did the infantry behave much better?
[32] Quoted in Arteche, xi. p. 178.
We may now turn to a less depressing narrative, the story of the
operations of Blake’s own wing. The Commander-in-Chief, as it will
be remembered, had with him the ‘Expeditionary Divisions,’ the
Valencian Reserve Division, and Loy’s and Caro’s 1,100 cavalry. He took
post himself on the height called El Puig, with one brigade of the
Valencians, to the south of the ravine of the Picador, which crosses
the plain in a diagonal direction. The rest of the troops went forward
in two columns: Zayas formed the right near the sea; his flank was
covered by a squadron of gunboats, which advanced parallel with him,
as near the shore as their draught permitted. He was ordered to push
on and get, if possible, round Suchet’s flank, where Habert’s line
was ‘refused,’ because of the guns of the flotilla, whose fire the
French wished to avoid. If successful Zayas was to try to communicate
with the garrison of Saguntum. Further inland Lardizabal’s division,
accompanied by the 1,100 cavalry, and followed by the other brigade
of the Valencian reserve, crossed the Picador at the bridge on the
_chaussée_, and deployed in the plain, directly opposite Harispe’s
division. The whole force was about equal to the French opposed to it.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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