A Manual of Moral PhilosophyPeabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Philosophy
A Manual of Moral Philosophy
Peabody, Andrew P. (Andrew Preston)
Ethics
*Passion* implies a _passive_ state,—a condition in which the will yields
without resistance to some dominant appetite, desire, or affection, under
whose imperious reign reason is silenced, considerations of expediency and
of right suppressed, and exterior counteracting motives neutralized. It
resembles insanity in the degree in which the actions induced by it are
the results of unreasoning impulse, and in the unreal and distorted views
which it presents of persons, objects, and events. It differs from
insanity, mainly in its being a self-induced madness, for which, as for
drunkenness, the sufferer is morally accountable, and in yielding to
which, as in drunkenness, he, by suffering his will to pass beyond the
control of reason, makes himself responsible, both legally and morally,
for whatever crimes or wrongs he commits in this state of mental
alienation.
*There is no appetite, desire, or affection which may not become a
passion*, and there is no passion which does not impair the sense of
right, and interfere with the discharge of duty. The appetites, the lower
desires, the malevolent affections, and, not infrequently, love, when they
become passions, have their issues in vice and crime. The nobler desires
and affections when made passions, may not lead to positive evil, but can
hardly fail to derange the fitting order of life, and to result in the
dereliction of some of its essential duties. Thus, the passion for
knowledge may render one indifferent to his social and religious
obligations. Philanthropy, when a passion, overlooks nearer for more
remote claims of duty, and is very prone to omit self-discipline and
self-culture in its zeal for world-embracing charities. Even the religious
affections, when they assume the character of passions, either, on the one
hand, are kindled into wild fanaticism, or, on the other, lapse into a
self-absorbed quietism, which forgets outside duties in the luxury of
devout contemplation; and though either of these is to be immeasurably
preferred to indifference, they both are as immeasurably inferior to that
piety, equally fervent and rational, which neglects neither man for God,
nor God for man, and which remains mindful of all human and earthly
relations, fitnesses, and duties, while at the same time it retains its
hold of faith, hope, and habitual communion, on the higher life.
* * * * *
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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