I consider, however, that exaggerated importance has been attached to this topic, since the actual deliveries of goods made under the Wiesbaden or similar agreements are not likely to be worth such large sums of money as are spoken of. Deliveries of coal, dyestuffs, and ships, dealt with in the Annexes to Part VIII. of the Treaty are specifically excluded from the operation of the Wiesbaden Agreement which is expressly limited to deliveries of plant and material, and these France undertakes to apply _solely_ to the reconstitution of the devastated regions. The quantities of goods, which French firms and individuals will be ready to order from Germany at the full market price, and which Germany can supply, for this limited purpose (so great a part of the cost of which is necessarily due to _labor_ employed on the spot and not to materials capable of being imported from Germany), are not likely to amount, during the next five years, to a sum of money which the other Allies need grudge France as a priority claim. My other reserve relates to the supposed importance of the Wiesbaden Agreement as a precedent for similar arrangements with the other Allies, and raises the general issue of the utility of arrangements for securing that Germany should pay in kind rather than in cash, for other purposes than those of the devastated areas. It is commonly believed that, if our demands on Germany are met by her delivering to us not cash but particular commodities selected by ourselves, we can thus avoid the competition of German products against our own in the markets of the world, which must result if we compel her to find foreign currency by selling goods abroad at whatever cut in price may be necessary to market them.[57]