Third objection: The high penalties of the bonds will drive many persons of small means from their accustomed occupations. They will not be able to procure the competent security for their prosecution. It is not to be presumed that this will be the effect to any great extent. If the owner is known to be honest, and has in view legal and honest objects, I have very little apprehension of his not being able to get the security required. But here the question recurs, are these apprehended inconveniences of such a nature as to render it necessary to abandon a great national object, for the accommodation of a few individuals who are affected by them? Is the last effort to preserve the peace of the nation, to be abandoned from these considerations? I should conclude, certainly not. The next objections are made to the seventh section of the bill, which provides that stress of weather, and other unavoidable accidents at sea, shall not be given in evidence in a trial at law to save the penalty of bonds given as security against the violation of the embargo laws. It is known that, through pretexts derived from this permission, at present, most of the violations of these laws have been committed with impunity--it is, therefore, important to the future execution of the laws, to take away these pretexts. But it is objected that this regulation manifests a distrust of oaths. It does, of what is called custom-house oaths; their violation is already almost proverbial; it does not, however, produce nor encourage this profligacy; it takes away the temptation to it. It is further said, it impairs the trial by jury--very far from it; the trial by jury still exists; this provision only regulates the evidence to be produced before the jury. Gentlemen state particular hardships which may take place under this regulation. It is easy to state possible hardships under any general regulation; but they have never been deemed sufficient objections to general regulations producing in other respects beneficial results. This bill, however, contains a provision for relief in all cases of hardships under the embargo laws. The Secretary of the Treasury is authorized to grant relief in all such cases. This power, vested in the Secretary, is also objected to. It is said to manifest a distrust of courts, and to transfer their powers to the Secretary of the Treasury. Whatever may be my distrust of some of the courts of the United States, I can say that consideration furnished no inducement to this provision. It is a power not suited to the organization of courts, and it has for a long time been exercised by the Secretary of the Treasury without being complained of. Congress proceeded with great caution on this subject. On the third day of March, 1797, they first introduced this principle into their laws in relation to the collection of the revenue; and, after an experiment of nearly three years, on the eleventh day of February, 1800, they made the law perpetual.