But what is meant by a _mere play_, when we know that in all conditions of humanity that very thing is play, and _only_ that is play which makes man complete and develops simultaneously his twofold nature? What you style _limitation_, according to your representation of the matter, according to my views, which I have justified by proofs. I name _enlargement_. Consequently I should have said exactly the reverse: man is serious _only_ with the agreeable, with the good, and with the perfect, but he _plays_ with beauty. In saying this we must not indeed think of the plays that are in vogue in real life, and which commonly refer only to his material state. But in real life we should also seek in vain for the beauty of which we are here speaking. The actually present beauty is worthy of the really, of the actually present play-impulse; but by the ideal of beauty, which is set up by the reason, an ideal of the play instinct is also presented, which man ought to have before his eyes in all his plays. Therefore, no error will ever be incurred if we seek the ideal of beauty on the same road on which we satisfy our play-impulse. We can immediately understand why the ideal form of a Venus, of a Juno, and of an Apollo, is to be sought not at Rome, but in Greece, if we contrast the Greek population, delighting in the bloodless athletic contests of boxing, racing, and intellectual rivalry at Olympia, with the Roman people gloating over the agony of a gladiator. Now the reason pronounces that the beautiful must not only be life and form, but a living form, that is, beauty, inasmuch as it dictates to man the twofold law of absolute formality and absolute reality. Reason also utters the decision that man shall only _play_ with beauty, and he _shall only play_ with _beauty_.