THE COURT: I cannot charge these propositions of course. The question, gentlemen of the jury, in the form it finally takes, is wholly a question or questions of law, and I have decided as a question of law, in the first place, that under the 14th Amendment, which Miss Anthony claims protects her, she was not protected in a right to vote. And I have decided also that her belief and the advice which she took does not protect her in the act which she committed. If I am right in this, the result must be a verdict on your part of guilty, and I therefore direct that you find a verdict of guilty. JUDGE SELDEN: That is a direction no Court has power to make in a criminal case. THE COURT: Take the verdict, Mr. Clerk. THE CLERK: Gentlemen of the jury, hearken to your verdict as the Court has recorded it. You say you find the defendant guilty of the offense whereof she stands indicted, and so say you all? JUDGE SELDEN: I don't know whether an exception is available, but I certainly must except to the refusal of the Court to submit those propositions, and especially to the direction of the Court that the jury should find a verdict of guilty. I claim that it is a power that is not given to any Court in a criminal case. Will the Clerk poll the jury? THE COURT: No. Gentlemen of the jury, you are discharged. On the next day a motion for a new trial was made by Judge Selden, as follows: _May it please the Court_: The trial of this case commenced with a question of very great magnitude--whether by the constitution of the United States the right of suffrage was secured to female equally with male citizens. It is likely to close with a question of much greater magnitude--whether the right of trial by jury is absolutely secured by the federal constitution to persons charged with crime before the federal courts. I assume, without attempting to produce any authority on the subject, that this Court has power to grant to the defendant a new trial in case it should appear that in the haste and in the lack of opportunity for examination which necessarily attend a jury trial, any material error should have been committed prejudicial to the defendant, as otherwise no means whatever are provided by the law for the correction of such errors. The defendant was indicted, under the nineteenth section of the act of Congress of May 31st, 1870, entitled, "An act to enforce the right of citizens of the United States to vote in the several states of this Union, and for other purposes," and was charged with having knowingly voted, without having a lawful right to vote, at the congressional election in the eighth ward of the City of Rochester, in November last; the only ground of illegality being that the defendant was a woman. The provisions of the act of Congress, so far as they bear upon the present case, are as follows: