Thus arises a conviction or belief that the design or end for which every thing exists is to make _the most_ happiness possible, and that those who conform to this design are acting right, while those who do not are acting wrong. Eventually there is established this conviction, also, that the _voluntary sacrifice of self‐enjoyment_ to promote the _best_ good of all, is the _highest_ kind of right action, and that those who practice this _the most_ are the _best in character_. The first feature of our moral sense, then, is, _that impression of the great design of all things_ which enables us to judge of the right and wrong in voluntary action. This also may be placed as one of the principles of common sense. God has so formed our minds and their circumstances, that the result is a universal _belief_ in every rational mind that whatever secures the _most_ happiness with the least evil is _right_, and whatever does not is _wrong_. The wanton and needless destruction of happiness also men believe to be wrong. Their only diversities of opinion are in regard to what will be _best_ and what will not. The second feature of our moral constitution is what is ordinarily called the _sense of justice_. It is that susceptibility which is excited at the view of the conduct of others as _voluntary_ causes of good or evil. In all cases where free agents act to promote happiness, an emotion of approval arises, together with a desire of reward to the author of the good. On the contrary, when there is a voluntary destruction of happiness, there is an emotion of disapproval, and a desire for retributive pain on the author of the wrong. These emotions are instinctive, and not at all regulated by reason in their inception. When an evil is done, an instant desire is felt _to discover the cause_; and when it is found, an instant desire is felt _to inflict some penalty_. So irrational is this impulse, that children will exhibit anger and deal blows on inanimate objects that cause pain. Even mature minds are sometimes conscious of this impulse. That this impulse is an implanted part of our constitution, and not the result of instruction, is seen in the delight manifested by young children in the narration of the nursery tale where the cruel uncle who murdered the Babes in the Wood receives the retributions of Heaven. It is the office of the intellect to judge whether the deed was a voluntary one, whether the agent intended the mischief, and whether a penalty will be of any use. The impulse to punish is never preceded by any such calculations.